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In 2003, Spain banned the political party Herri Batasuna and its successors Euskal 
Herritarrok and Batasuna for integration in the Basque separatist terrorist group 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna. Since then, eleven other parties or electoral groupings 
deemed successors to the illegal parties have also been banned. The party bans in 
Spain highlight weaknesses in leading theoretical accounts of proscription and 
democratic responses to extremism, weaknesses that are symptomatic of broader 
problems with the paradigmatic concept of ‘militant democracy’. More specifically, 
closer examination of the Spanish case illustrates an error of classification in Fox and 
Nolte’s (2000) distinction between ‘tolerant’ and ‘intolerant’ democracies, but also 
suggests a strategy for responding to a more fundamental problem of internal 
inconsistency in their model. 
 
 
I Introduction: The Problem with Militant Democracy 
 
‘Militant democracy’ is a paradigmatic concept in the study of democratic responses 
to political extremism. Its origins are usually traced to Karl Loewenstein’s appeal for 
robust responses to the rise of fascism in 1930s Europe.1 Loewenstein thought 
‘fundamentalist’ commitments to democratic principles could be ‘suicidal’ because 
‘under cover of fundamental rights and the rule of law, the anti-democratic machine 
could be built up and set in motion legally’.2 Only timely implementation of anti-
fascist legislation – including bans on party paramilitary organisations and political 
uniforms, prosecution of incitement to violence or hatred and the proscription of 
subversive movements or parties- could provide democracies with effective defence 
against such techniques.3 In the post-war period, justifications and techniques of 
militant democracy have become widely used, with Germany the best known example 
of a so-called militant democracy.4 The German Basic Law explicitly bans parties that 
                                                 
1 K. Loewenstein, ‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I,’ (1995) 31 The American Political 
Science Review 417. 
2  Ibid, 423-4. 
3 Ibid, 429 
4 G. Brunner, ‘The Treatment of Anti-constitutional Parties in Eastern Europe’, in 
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seek to damage or destroy the ‘free democratic basic order’ and Federal Constitutional 
Court rulings have clarified that political parties must positively adhere to democratic 
values.5 Subsequently, the European Court of Human Rights developed a robust 
doctrine of militant democracy.6  
 
One widely recognised problem with militant democracy is that it requires difficult 
choices about whether or not to ‘tolerate the intolerant’.7 On the one hand, militant 
democracy is a response to what Popper called the ‘paradox of tolerance’, whereby 
‘unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance’.8 On the other, an 
overzealous application of the instruments of militant democracy, which potentially 
affect a wide range of political and civil rights, may diminish the quality of 
democracy in practice. In this article, however, I focus on a different problem with 
militant democracy: its limited utility as a concept for conceptualising variation in 
democratic responses to extremism.  
 
In recent years, many scholars have criticised the concept of ‘militant democracy’ for 
being too vague, too imprecise or too narrowly focused on legal instruments.9 Some 
have preferred to reconceptualise democratic militancy as a matter of degree – a 
democracy may therefore be either more or less militant.10 Others have sought to 
develop more elaborate or comprehensive classificatory schemes and replace the 
rubric of militant democracy with a new vocabulary of ‘defending’11 or ‘intolerant’12 
                                                                                                                                            
F. Feldbrugge and W. Simons (eds), Human Rights in Russia and Eastern Europe (Kluwer, 2000) at 
15; G. Fox and G. Nolte, ‘Intolerant Democracies’, in G.  Fox and B Roth (eds), Democratic 
Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 389; M. Thiel The Militant 
Democracy Principle in Modern Democracies (Ashgate, 2009). 
5 O. Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends (Princeton 
University Press, 1961). 
6 P. Harvey, ‘Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2004), 29 
European Law Review 407; P. Macklem, Guarding the Perimeter: militant democracy and Religious 
Freedom in Europe (2010) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1660649.  
7 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971), 216-221. 
8 K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies (Routledge, 1966) at 265.  
9 C. Mudde ‘Defending democracy and the extreme right,’ in R. Eatwell and C. Mudde (eds.) Western 
Democracies and the Extreme Right Challenge (Routledge, 2004) at 197; A. Pedahzur, ‘The defending 
democracy and the extreme right: A Comparative Analysis’, in R. Eatwell and C. Mudde (eds.), 
Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge (Routledge: London, 2004) at 109-10; 
Thiel op cit. n. 4 supra at 384.  
10 O. Pfersmann, ‘Shaping militant democracy: Legal Limits to Democratic Stability’, in A. Sajó (ed), 
Militant Democracy (Eleven International Publishing, 2004), 53. 
11 Pedahzur op cit n. 9 supra; Giovanni Capoccia, “Repression, Incorporation, Lustration, Education: 
How Democracies React To Their Enemies: Towards a Theoretical Framework for Comparative 
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democracies. For those that continue to use the terminology of militant democracy, its 
meaning has tended to expand from a narrow focus on fascist and communist parties 
using democratic entitlements to gain control of the state,13 into shorthand for a much 
wider range of measures employed against all kinds of extremist threats.14  
 
While this body of work provides many useful insights, the ‘reworked’ concept of 
militant democracy is problematic. In essence, it has become the victim of ‘concept 
stretching’.15 Indeed, some argue that there is no discernable alternative to militant 
democracy because ‘it is barely conceivable that a country does not have (or never 
has) taken legally defensive measures to fight…against political extremists or terrorist 
threats’.16 In other words, if all democracies are in some sense militant democracies, 
we cannot be certain what a non-militant democracy is. And yet understanding 
variation in state responses to extremism provides valuable insights into how 
democratic states might juggle competing commitments to tolerate reasonable 
political dissent, while guaranteeing their physical security and providing suitable 
conditions for all citizens’ enjoyment of liberties. 
 
In this article, I review two widely-known classificatory schemes which try to 
overcome this problem of definitional vagueness, namely Ami Pedazhur’s (2004) 
conceptualisation of ‘defending democracies’ and Fox and Nolte’s (2000) typology of 
‘tolerant’ and ‘intolerant democracies’. I do so in order to identify more robust ways 
of conceptualising variation in democratic responses to extremism and more 
specifically, proscription of extremist political parties. Particular attention to the 
problem of party bans is apposite given that proscription is widely recognised as a 
particularly grave measure –the prestigious European Commission for Democracy 
                                                                                                                                            
Analysis of Defence of Democracy”, Paper presented to ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshop, Grenoble, 
6-11, April 2001. 
12 Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra. 
13 eg, Loewenstein op cit n. 1 supra; D. Kommers, Judicial Politics in West Germany (Sage, 1976) at 
238. 
14 eg. A. Sajó (ed,), Militant Democracy (Eleven International Publishing, 2004); Thiel op cit n. 4 
supra; Macklem op cit n. 6 supra.   
15 G. Sartori, ‘Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics’ (1970), 64 The American Political 
Science Review 1033. 
16 Thiel op cit n. 4 supra at 384; see also C. Vidal, ‘Spain’, in M. Thiel (ed), The ‘militant democracy’ 
principle in modern democracies (Ashgate, 2009) at 260. 
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Through Law, for instance, recommended bas be used as a measure of last resort 17 – 
and because proscription profoundly affects fundamental liberties of association and 
expression, political representation and the conduct of democratic competition. A case 
study of party bans in Spain, which from 2003 proscribed a succession of radical 
Basque nationalist parties and electoral groupings for integration in the terrorist group 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom), illustrates problems 
with these approaches in their existing forms, but also provides the substance for an 
amended framework. I begin with an analysis of Pedazhur, Fox and Nolte’s work. 
 
II Defending, militant and immunized democracies  
 
Pedahzur’s analysis of ‘defending democracies’ identifies two ideal type responses to 
political extremism.18 On the one hand, a less-belligerent, ‘immunized’, approach will 
deal with subversive acts against the government or state in a more comprehensive 
and liberal manner.19 It will focus on treating both causes and symptoms of 
extremism, provide opportunities for civil society initiatives against extremism and 
will try to inculcate democratic values through programmes of civic education. State 
responses will be within normal legal and constitutional limits and renounce extensive 
use of measures like restrictions on freedom of movement or infiltration of extremist 
groups.  
 
In contrast, a ‘militant’ route focuses on the symptoms of extremism, such as 
incitement and violence, and employs measures which may undermine democratic 
standards, such as illegal police monitoring or party bans which circumvent standard 
legal and judicial processes. Such a response will make frequently use special police 
and security services and continually expand the legal framework to confront 
extremists. It will show little interest in treating causes of extremism though 
                                                 
17 The European Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venice Commission, is 
the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters. Guidelines on the Proscription and 
Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures drawn up in 1999 by Venice Commission 
caution that proscription is ‘a particularly far-reaching measure should be used with utmost restraint’ 
and urges government to consider using ‘less radical measures could prevent the said danger’. 
18 While Pedahzur op cit n. 9 supra develops this framework primarily with reference to right wing 
extremists, it can easily be applied to other types of political extremism. 
19 Ibid, 115-116. 
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promoting democratic socialisation through the education system or promote civil 
society initiatives.  
 
At first glance, it appears logical to assume that states adopting more militant 
responses are more likely to ban a political party than one adopting an immunized 
response. However, more detailed case study analysis demonstrates that this is not so: 
Pedazhur argues that ban proceedings in both Germany and Israel were conducted in 
accordance with strong commitments to liberal values, and for this reason, were 
characteristic of an immunized response to extremism.20 In short, Pedazur’s 
conceptualisation of ‘defending democracies’ does not help conceptualise variation in 
state practices relating to party bans. Fox and Nolte’s typology of ‘tolerant’ and 
‘intolerant’ democracies does better in this regard. 
 
III Tolerant and Intolerant Democracies 
 
Fox and Nolte develop a two dimensional typology of democratic responses to 
extremism.21 On the one hand, they distinguish between contrasting ‘procedural’ and 
‘substantive’ conceptions of democracy. On the other, they distinguishes between 
states which actively (or militantly) employ measures against such actors and those 
which do not (passive or tolerant), even when their legal system may permit them to 
do so.  
  
A ‘procedural model’ draws on Schumpeter’s conception of democracy as an 
institutional arrangement for choosing leaders and determining the political 
preferences of majorities.22 The views of all citizens are given equal consideration and 
the primacy of majority rule as a basis for legitimacy limits state authority to select 
among competing views. An individual’s capacity for reason, a continual process of 
self-examination and knowledge of alternatives strengthen public commitment to 
democracy, but cannot ensure it will always prevail. Tolerance is a transcendent 
norm. This ‘rough approximation of actual state practice’23 takes more concrete form 
                                                 
20 Ibid, 119-120. 
21 Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra.  
22 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Allen and Unwin, 1947). 
23  Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra at 406. 
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in specific constitutional features, including the absence of substantive limits on Acts 
of Parliament, or the absence of restrictions on the scope of constitutional change.24  
 
In a ‘substantive democracy’, by contrast, democratic procedure is conceived as a 
means for creating a society where citizens enjoy core rights and liberties. It draws on 
Mill, Rawls and others in its insistence that rights cannot be used to abolish other 
rights, and that a democracy need not tolerate the intolerant when its core values are at 
stake. An unalterable democratic core deserves special protection against possible 
incursions. The most important characteristic of a substantive democracy’s legal 
system are specific prohibitions on amendment of core constitutional commitments to 
democracy (or other core principles such as territorial integrity or secularlism).  
 
When combined with the above-mentioned distinctions between active-militant and 
passive-tolerant state practices, four categories emerge as summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Fox and Notle’s Model of ‘Tolerant’ and ‘Intolerant democracies’ 
 Procedural democracy Substantive democracy 
Passive-tolerant Tolerant procedural 
democracy 
Britain, Botswana, Japan 
Tolerant substantive 
democracy 
France, Canada, India 
Active-militant Militant Procedural 
democracy 
United States (1940s, 1950s) 
Militant substantive 
democracy 
Germany, Israel, Costa Rica 
 
 
A tolerant procedural democracy, like Britain, Botswana and Japan, will possess one 
or more of the following characteristics:25  
• No substantive limitations on Acts of Parliament; or  
• No restrictions on the scope of constitutional amendments; or 
• Most constitutional scholars will consider proscription of parties 
unconstitutional due, for instance, to the absence of specific constitutional 
authorization to ban parties and or free association guarantees.  
                                                 
24 Ibid 406-8. 
25 Ibid, 406-8. 
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It will be ‘passive’ or ‘restrained’ in the application of measures against extremist 
parties.26 A tolerant procedural democracy may not invoke relevant constitutional 
provisions, or if it does, will employ them against a narrow range of extremists such 
as those employing violence.  
 
A militant procedural democracy enacts ‘qualitatively more restrictive anti-
subversion legislation’ than other procedural democracies.27 For instance, the United 
States - whose constitution does not preclude the possibility of amendments 
abolishing the republican form of government – adopted legislation in the 1940s and 
1950s criminalizing members of groups wanting to overthrow government by force 
(Smith Act, 1940), requiring registration of parties designated subversive (Internal 
Security Act, 1950) and denying the Communist Party of the United States of 
America and its successors all rights and privileges under state and federal law 
(Communist Control Act, 1954).28   
 
Tolerant substantive democracies possess one or more of the following features:  
• specific prohibitions on amending core constitutional commitments to 
democracy or fundamental constitutional principles (such as territorial 
integrity or secularism); or 29  
• a constitutional duty for political parties to respect the principles of 
democracy; or 30  
• constitutional provisions explicitly permitting restrictions on core rights of 
association when necessary to protect fundamental democratic principles.31  
However, a tolerant substantive democracy will not invoke existing rules against 
extremist parties or will, as in the case of France, apply them against small groups on 
the political fringe rather than against major political parties.32  
 
A militant substantive democracy will apply legal rules permitting proscription of 
parties more often and justify proscription on a wider range of grounds than other 
                                                 
26  Ibid, 407. 
27 Ibid, 409. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid, 417. 
30 Ibid, 412 
31 Ibid, 413. 
32 Ibid, 412. 
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substantive democracies. In the 1950s, for instance, West Germany proscribed the 
Socialist Reich Party and the Communist Party of Germany for wanting to overthrow 
the ‘free democratic basic order’ despite the absence of concrete undertakings to that 
end or evidence of actual or imminent danger to the democratic system.33  
 
One problem with Fox and Nolte’s typology is generates inconsistent expectations 
about outcomes. While the very definition of a procedural democracy – characterized 
by a commitment to ‘open debate and electoral competition among all ideological 
factions’34 - generates the expectation that procedural democracies are less likely to 
ban political parties, an orientation of active-militancy acknowledges the empirical 
reality that procedural democracies do in fact ban parties. This problem is particularly 
apparent in Fox and Nolte’s category of militant procedural democracy (Figure 1).  
 
Another problem is what Sartori calls mislabelling.35 Fox and Nolte’s use of the term 
‘tolerant’ as a synonym for a passive orientation to proscription is not consistent with 
common sense or philosophical notions of tolerance, especially when ‘tolerance’ is 
attributed to a country like France which ‘frequently’ banned small groups and 
parties.36 By most definitions, tolerance involves ‘putting up with what you oppose’ 
when another person’s life choices or actions may shock, enrage, frighten or disgust 
us.37  
 
Furthermore, Vidal argues that conceptions of procedural and substantive democracy 
underestimate the extent to which all democracies must guarantee certain procedures 
(eg. elections and majority decisions) and commit to core values (eg. freedom, justice, 
equality) to qualify as a democratic.38 While this is undoubtedly the case, it does not 
rule out the utility of relating these theoretical concepts to empirically observable 
variation in legal-constitutional responses to the problem of extremism. Thiel accepts 
the utility of distinctions between procedural and substantive democracy, but 
challenges the validity of distinctions between tolerant-inactive and militant-active 
responses, arguing that all democracy employ measures of some kind against political 
                                                 
33 Ibid, 416 
34 Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra at 389. Thiel op cit n. 4 supra at 389 makes a similar point.  
35 Giovanni Sartori, ‘Comparing and Miscomparing’, (1991) 3 Journal of Theoretical Politics 247.  
36 Ibid, 412. 
37 Catriona McKinnon, Toleration (Routledge, 2006) at 4. 
38  Vidal op cit n. 16 supra at 245. 
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extremists.39 This point has already been addressed in this article’s introduction: If 
militancy is defined widely to include all measures employed against extremists, be it 
limits on public service appointments, public dress codes, rules against incitement or 
counterterrorism policy, then this point is reasonable. It is less so if it the distinction is 
used to gauge the much simpler matter of whether or not a democracy bans a political 
party. The proscription of political parties may be defined as the dissolution and 
complete exclusion of a political party from elections, government office and the 
public sphere; denial of formal registration as a political party; or withdrawing a 
party’s fundamental political rights and privileges without total exclusion from the 
public sphere.  
 
One final critique identifies discrepancies in the classification of particular countries 
into different categories.40  Spain is one such instance of misclassification.41 On closer 
inspection, it becomes clear that since the proscription of radical Basque nationalist 
parties in 2003, Spain is an instance of Fox and Nolte’s problematic militant 
procedural category. Consequently, a more detailed discussion of the Spanish case is 
likely to provide valuable insights on the nature of problems with Fox and Nolte’s 
model and how they might be resolved.  
 
IV Basque terrorism and the ban on Batasuna et al. 
 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, Basque Homeland and Freedom) was founded in 1959 
during – and as a response to the repression of - the dictatorship of General Francisco 
Franco. It was formed by a small group of Basque youths dissatisfied with the civil 
war generation of Basque nationalists and the dominant Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
(Basque Nationalist Party, PNV). The group sought to establish an independent 
socialist state, encompassing Basque provinces in Spain and France, in order to 
protect and promote Basque culture and language.42 Following Franco’s death in 1975 
and the subsequent transition to democracy, the largest faction in ETA – ETA militar 
– still considered the Basque Country an occupied territory of Spain and France and 
                                                 
39 Thiel op cit n.4 supra at 389. 
40 Ibid, 288-305 
41 Vidal op cit n. 16 supra.  
42 G. Jáuregui, ‘ETA: Orígenes y evolución ideológica y política’, in A. Elorza, J. M. Garmendia, G. 
Jáuregui, F. Dominguez (eds), La Historia de ETA (Temas de Hoy, 2002); D. Muro ‘Nationalism and 
nostalgia: the case of radical Basque nationalism’, (2005) 11 Nations and Nationalism 571. 
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considered armed struggle necessary for national liberation. ETA rejected Spain’s 
1978 democratic constitution, which did not recognise a right to Basque self-
determination. The 1979 Basque Autonomy Statute devolving powers to new Basque 
institutions was seen as an obstacle to the achievement of independence. In contrast, 
democratisation and autonomy lure the faction known as ETA político militar from 
violence.  
 
During an intense period of political agitation and repression in the Basque Country, 
ETA mounted a massive campaign of terror against the reform process.43 In the 
transition years 1978-9 ETA assassinated 142 people, and in 1980, ETA was 
responsible for 92 deaths. Since the first confirmed ETA killing in 1968, ETA has 
been responsible for the deaths of 829 people, while injuring, kidnapping and 
extorting thousands of others. ETA declared ceasefires of varying duration on ten 
occasions between 1981 and 2010 which mostly coincided with efforts to initiate or 
conduct negotiations with the central government. None of these have yet produced 
an agreement whereby ETA has agreed to permanently abandon violence. 
 
In 1975, key organizations of the radical Basque nationalist left formed Koordinadora 
Abertzale Sozialista (KAS, Patriotic Socialist Coordinator).44 Alongside ETA itself, 
KAS members included what was initially the main political party Herriko Alderdi 
Sozialista Iraultzailea (HASI), the trade union, Langile Abertzaleen Batzordeak 
(LAB), the youth organization Jarrai, and the prisoners’ lobby Gestoras Pro Amnistía.  
KAS was to direct activities of participating groups, Herri Batasuna (HB), and the 
whole social tapestry of associations supporting ETA, known as the Euskal Herri 
Askapenerako Mugimendua (Basque National Liberation Movement, EHAM) or more 
generally, the izquierda abertzale (radical nationalist left).45   
 
HB was formed in 1978, by a coalition of radical Basque nationalist parties, including 
HASI. Euskal Herritarrok (EH) emerged in 1998 as an electoral coalition, dominated 
by HB. It was refounded as Batasuna in 2001. When permitted to contest elections, 
                                                 
43 F. Domínguez, ‘El Enfrentamiento de ETA con la Democracia’, in A. Elorza (ed), La Historia de 
ETA (Temas de Hoy, 2006), 273-372. 
44 F. Llera, ‘Ejercito Secreto y movimiento social’, (1992) 78 Revista de Estudios Políticos, 161-193; J. 
M. Mata, El nacionalism vasco radical (Universidad del País Vasco, 1993), 95-131. 
45 Domínguez op cit n. 43 supra at 274; Llera op cit n. 44 supra, 183-6.  
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HB and its various successors obtained ample representation in Basque political 
institutions. In Basque parliament elections, for instance, the party won an average of 
15.47 per cent of the vote and between seven and 14 seats. When it took part in 
Spanish general elections (between 1979 and 1996), HB won an average of 203,315 
votes and three seats, with its best performance in 1986 when it won 231,722 votes 
and five parliamentary seats.  
The decision to ban Batasuna after twenty years of direct participation in electoral 
processes was a high profile and polemical decision in Spain. It coincided with 
deepening political polarization in Basque politics. In an effort to ‘socialise the pain’ 
of nationalist struggle, create social tensions and force Basque citizens to openly take 
sides, ETA and its supporters unleashed a wave of violence on the streets of the 
Basque Country and widened the targets of terrorist attacks beyond police and 
security service personnel to journalists, civil servants, judges, academics and 
politicians from the main political parties.46 The brutal kidnapping and assassination 
of Popular Party councilor Miguel Ángel Blanco mobilized millions of citizens in the 
Basque Country and beyond against ETA, bolstered a Basque peace movement and 
prompted closer cooperation between mainstream parties on security policy.47 With 
the support of opposition Socialists, the Popular Party government of José María 
Aznar took a tougher line on ETA and its supporters, matched by a judicial campaign, 
spearheaded by Judge Baltazar Garzón of the Audiencia Nacional, to criminalise and 
dismantle ETA’s support networks. A short-lived Basque ‘nationalist front’, involving 
both radicals and moderates and formalised in the 1998 Lizarra Pact, produced a 
temporary ETA ceasefire but deepened tensions with the so-called ‘constitutionalists’, 
who sought to maintaining the constitutional status quo against the Basque 
nationalists’ independence agenda. 
Article 6 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution defines political parties as ‘the expression 
of political pluralism’, responsible for ‘the formation and expression of the will of the 
people’ and ‘an essential instrument for political participation’. The Constitution does 
not explicitly permit proscription of parties. However, article 6 requires that, while 
parties can be freely created, parties must ‘respect the Constitution and the law’ and 
                                                 
46 D. Muro, Ethnicity and Violence (Routledge, 2008), 155-7. 
47 Ibid, 165-167. 
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must be ‘democratic in their internal structure and functioning’. Furthermore, as a 
specific form of association, political parties are subject to constitutional provisions in 
article 22.48 This article explicitly prohibits secret and paramilitary associations and 
declares that ‘associations which pursue ends or use means classified as crimes are 
illegal’. Illicit associations are defined in the Spanish Penal Code as groups involved 
in organized crime; armed, violent or terrorist groups; and those inciting hatred or 
violence against others.49  
 
Law 54/1978, the first law on political parties in democratic Spain, permitted 
proscription of parties proven to be ‘illicit associations’ or which were not democratic 
in their internal structure and functioning.50 This law was replaced in June 2002 by 
the new Organic Law on Political Parties (LOPP) which added an additional 
justification for proscription; namely, conduct threatening to undermine the liberal 
democratic system. More specifically, this last justification for proscription, permitted 
the courts to dissolve parties that ‘violate democratic principles in a repeated and 
grave form, or aim to undermine or destroy the regime of liberties, or injure or 
eliminate the democratic system’ (article 9.2) Conduct deemed to violate democratic 
principles were listed as (LOPP article 9.2 a-c): 
• promoting, justifying or excusing of attacks on people’s life or integrity, or 
exclusion or persecution of people because of their ideology, religion or 
beliefs, nationality, race, sex or sexual orientation 
• Encouraging, promoting or legitimizing violence as a means to achieve 
political goals, or to destroying conditions necessary for democracy, pluralism 
and political liberties 
• Complementing or supporting politically, the activities of terrorist 
organizations which aim to subvert the constitutional order, gravely alter 
public peace, create a climate of fear, or enhance the effects of fear and 
intimidation generated by terrorist violence  
 
                                                 
48 R. Blanco Valdés, Los Partidos Políticos (Tecnos, 1990), 159. 
49 Código Penal, 12a edición 2008, Editorial COLEX, Madrid, 1238.  
50 J. A Montilla, ‘Algunos Cambios en la concepción de los partidos. Comentario a la STC 48/2003, 
Sobre La Ley Orgánica 6/2002, de Partidos Políticos’,  (2003-4) 12-13 Teoría y Realidad 
Constitutional,  563.  
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Political parties must apply to the Interior Ministry for inscription in a register of 
political parties to obtain relevant legal entitlements. A special chamber of the 
Supreme Court rules on bans for nondemocratic internal functioning and threatening 
democratic and liberal values. The Supreme Court is responsible for preventing 
formation of new parties, or the use of existing ones, which continue the activities of a 
banned party (LOPP article 12.3). Succession is determined by similarities in 
structure, organization and functioning with a banned party, as well as the presence of 
similar people who direct, represent or administer the party and financial and material 
resources employed. Evidence that a party also supports violence or terrorism is 
crucial for determining succession. 
  
In the 1980s, the government unsuccessfully sought to deny registration to HB 
because its party statutes did not require party members to be Spanish nationals or 
expressly state the party’s ‘respect’ for the constitution.51 The Supreme Court 
overturned the decision, arguing, among other things, that parties were not required to 
explicitly declare respect for the constitution. Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court 
rejected the government’s request to declare HB an illicit association because HB’s 
documentation for registration did not show any signs of criminality.52 HB was 
formally registered as a political party in 1986. 
 
In March 2003, in the first application of the LOPP, the Supreme Court declared HB, 
EH and Batasuna illegal.53 The suit was initiated by the Attorney General and Public 
Prosecutor, on the initiative of an overwhelming majority of deputies in the Spanish 
parliament’s lower house. The Supreme Court accepted the government’s evidence 
establishing the subordination of HB, EH and Batasuna to the strategy and mandates 
of a terrorist group, ETA.54 Evidence of links with ETA included the presence of a 
significant number of people with terrorist convictions in positions of responsibility in 
the party, its parliamentary groups and electoral lists.  
 
                                                 
51 M. Esparza, La Ilegalización de Batasuna (Aranzadi, 2004) at 145. 
52 Ibid, 144-145. 
53 Sentence of the Supreme Court, STS de 27 de marzo de 2003. 
54 E. Vírgala, ‘La STS de 27 de marzo de 2003 de ilegalización de Batasuna: el Estado de Derecho 
Penetra en Euskadi’, (2003-4) 12-13 Teoría y Realidad Constitucional at  614. 
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The second main thrust of the government’s and Public Prosecutor’s case was to 
establish that, since entry into force of the LOPP, Batasuna continued to act as a 
political complement to ETA and thereby violated article 9.2.c of the LOPP 
prohibiting support for the activity of terrorist organisations, charges which Batasuna 
also denied.55 The Supreme Court accepted evidence that Batasuna or its leading 
members had undertaken acts: explicitly or tacitly supporting, excusing or minimising 
the significance of terrorist actions; of provocation and confrontation to neutralise and 
isolate those opposing terrorism; using terrorist symbols; collaborating with 
organisations linked to terrorism; promoting or participating in acts of homage to 
terrorists.  
 
Since proscription of Batasuna in 2003, ETA and its political wing developed a 
complex strategy to return to electoral politics under a different guise. As Table 1 
below indicates, since the proscription of HB, EH and Batasuna in 2003: two parties 
have been denied registration (Abertzale Sozialisten Batasuna and Sortu); two parties 
have been declared illegal and dissolved (Eusko Abertzale Ekintza (EAE) and Euskal 
Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista (EHAK); and two parties have had their party lists 
disqualified for particular elections (EAE and Askatasuna).56 Around five hundred 
lists of candidates presented by electoral groupings57 have been disqualified for local, 
provincial, autonomous community and European Parliament elections (including 
Autodeterminaziorako Bilgunea, Herritarren Zerrenda, Aukera Guztiak, Abertzale 
Sozialistak, Demokrazia Hiru Milioi).58 The Supreme Court, and later the 
Constitutional Court, endorsed most suits calling for the dissolution of parties or 
disqualification of party or electoral grouping lists, with the notable exception of 
Iniziatiba Internazionalista and Bildu.  
 
Table 1: The Proscription of Political Parties in Spain  
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 A. J. Pérez and X. Ferreiro, ‘La ilegalización de D3M y Askatasuna: Problemas Jurídicos-
Procesales’, (2009) 4 El Cronista del Estado Social y Democrático de Derecho 68; J. Tajadura y E. 
Vírgala, ‘Espana’, in J. Corcuera, J. Tajadura and E. Vírgala (eds), La Ilegalización de Partidos 
Políticos en las Democracias Occidentales (Dykinson, 2008), 17-111.  
57 An electoral group is a collection of individuals which associate temporarily with the aim of 
presenting candidates in a specific electoral constituency in a single electoral contest. 
58 M. Iglesias, La ilegalización de partidos políticos en el ordenamiento jurídico español (Comares, 
2008); M. Pérez-Moneo, ‘Aukera Guztiak y la sucesión de Batasuna: un nuevo episodio en la 
ilegalización de partidos’, (2005) 74 Revista Española de Derecho Constituciona  395. 
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Party  Year of 
ban  
Type of ban 
procedure 
Grounds for ban 
Herri Batasuna 1984 Non-registration 
(overruled) 
Formal defects 






2003 Parties declared illegal 
and dissolved. 
Complement to and 
support for a terrorist 
organisation.  
Autodeterminaziorako 
Bilgunea and others 
2003 Disqualification of 
electoral grouping lists 
(local elections) 
Batasuna successor 
Herritarren Zerenda 2004 Disqualification of 
electoral grouping list 
(European parliament) 
Batasuna successor  
Aukera Guztiak  2005 Disqualification of 












2007 Disqualification of 
party lists  
(local elections) 
Batasuna successor 
Abertzale Sozialistak 2007 Disqualification of 












2008 Party declared illegal 
and dissolved 
Batasuna successor  
 








2009 Disqualification of 
electoral grouping lists 
(Successor to banned 
party) 




2009 Disqualification of 







Sortu 2011 Non-registration 
(municipal and 
provincial elections)  
Batasuna successor  
Bildu 2011 Disqualification of 









V Is Spain a ‘militant substantive’ democracy? 
 
Fox and Nolte don’t discuss the Spanish legal system in any detail, but suggest that 
Spain ought to be considered a militant substantive democracy because its 
constitution contains ‘clauses prohibiting the reestablishment of the Fascist party’.59  
However, a closer examination of the Spanish case shows that Fox and Nolte’s 
judgement was too hasty.60 When Fox and Nolte published their article in 2000, no 
political parties had yet been banned in Spain (see Table 1). If militancy is defined as 
active implementation, then by this criteria Spain does not meet it. Parties were only 
banned after enactment of the LOPP in 2002 and proscription of HB, EH and 
Batasuna in 2003.   
 
More importantly, the literal text of article 6 of the Spanish constitution is not widely 
regarded by Spanish legal scholars as justification for characterising Spain as a 
substantive democracy. Indeed, the majority of Spanish legal scholars characterize the 
Spanish constitutional order as an ‘open’ or ‘procedural’ democracy. Four arguments 
articulated by Jiménez Campo and de Otto Pardo have been particularly influential in 
establishing this position.61 Firstly, during parliamentary debates on the draft 1978 
Spanish constitution deputies explicitly rejected establishing a ‘substantive model’ of 
democracy along the lines of the German Basic Law.  More importantly, the 
constitution contains no express provisions authorizing measures against 
                                                 
59 Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra, 418-9. 
60  Vidal draws the same conclusión, op cit n. 16 supra. 
61 J. Jímenez, “La Intervención Estatal del Pluralismo”, (1981) 1 Revista Española de Derecho 
Constitucional 161 and I. de Otto, Defensa de la Constitución y Partidos Políticos (Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales, 1985). 
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unconstitutional parties. Thirdly, according to the Constitution’s article 168, the 
Constitution itself is open to ‘total’ revision. It would not, therefore, be logical to 
prohibit efforts to attain what the constitution ultimately permits, so that parties 
wanting to change the constitution, including those who wanted to destroy its liberal 
democratic character, could indeed desire and articulate this preference without 
violating the constitution. Finally, imposition of limits on political parties would 
undermine constitutional commitments to equality (article 14), especially among 
citizens who chose to participate in politics through parties and those who did not. 
Measures imposing limits on parties – and not imposing parallel limits on public 
powers – would also contravene article 9.1 requirements for equal subjection to the 
Constitution and the Law. This ideological liberty, however, did not mean parties 
were free to act as they choose. Early Constitutional Court rulings established that 
political parties must pursue their objectives through means permitted by the 
constitution.62  
  
Parliamentary approval of the LOPP reopened debate on this question. One issue was 
whether the Constitution permitted proscription of political parties for activities other 
than those spelt out in the penal code (article 22.X) or a party’s undemocratic internal 
structure and functioning (article 6).  Pérez Royo, for instance, argued that these were 
the only grounds for banning a party and that proscription of parties for conduct 
threatening to undermine the liberal democratic system, spelt out in article 9.2 of the 
LOPP (see above), had no constitutional basis.63 In contrast, Blanco Valdés 
considered the LOPP to be in accordance with earlier jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court permitting dissolution of parties for such activities and the 
accepted and unchallenged provisions of the previous Law 54/1978 permitting 
dissolution of parties for activities contrary to democratic principles.64  Nor did he 
think that it contradicted the logical intuition that democratic activity was by its nature 
activity ‘respectful’ of the constitution and the law and thus constituted an appropriate 
application of the Spanish Constitution’s article 6.65  
 
                                                 
62 de Otto op cit n. 61supra at 45. 
63 J. Pérez Rojo, ‘El Derecho de Batasuna a no condenar’, El Pais, 20 August 2002, 9-10. 
64 R. Blanco Valdés, ‘La nueva ley de partidos y la defensa del Estado’ in L. López and E. Espín (eds), 
La Defensa del Estado (Tirant lo blanch, 2004) 
65 Ibid, 54. 
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Forced to address the question in 2003, the Constitutional Court confirmed the view 
that the Spanish legal order was an open or procedural order and that the LOPP did 
not transform it into a substantive one. One of the principal justifications for this view 
– which was based on the distinction between the prohibition of anti-democratic (or 
anti-system) ideologies and anti-democratic (or anti-system) behaviour – is of 
particular interest because, as I argue in the next section, it helps address fundamental 
problems in Fox and Nolte’s model. The Constitutional Court argued that Spain was 
not a substantive democracy because only ‘conducts’ were contemplated as grounds 
for proscription, not a party’s ultimate objectives.66 In so doing, the Constitutional 
Court endorsed the position of legislators written into the Preamble of the LOPP that 
‘any project or objective is compatible with the Constitution, so long as it is not 
defended by an activity which violates democratic principles or fundamental rights of 
citizens’.  
 
In sum, Spain ought to be regarded as a tolerant procedural democracy up to 2003 
and as a militant procedural democracy since then – not as Fox and Nolte argue a 
militant substantive democracy. However, as I spelt out above, the problem with Fox 
and Nolte’s model are greater than the misclassification of countries into categories. 
In what follows, I rework Fox and Nolte’s model by adding an additional dimension 
to their typology in order to develop more plausible classification of approaches to the 
proscription of political parties.  
 
VI Classifying party bans: A new typology 
 
My typology presents a three dimensional classification of democratic states’ 
responses to extremist political parties and more specifically, state practices regarding 
the proscription of political parties.  Figure 2 summarises the model.  
                                                 
66 Sentence of the Spanish Constitutional Court 48/2003 of 12 March 
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Figure 2: Tolerant and Intolerant Democracies: A New Typology 
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A Procedural and substantive democracies 
 
The model retains the categories ‘procedural democracy’ and ‘substantive democracy’ 
which, following Fox and Nolte, represent both conceptions of democracy that have 
concrete form in distinctive legal-constitutional arrangements (see table 2). These are 
mutually exclusive categorisations – a democracy is either a procedural or a 
substantive democracy, not a mixture of the two - and as such should be conceived as 
a dichotomous variable.  
 
Table 2: Procedural versus Substantive Democracies 
Procedural Substantive 
No substantive limits on Acts of 
Parliament; or  
Specific constitutional prohibitions 
on amendment of core constitutional 
commitments to democracy or other 
fundamental features of 
constitutional order; or 
No restrictions on the scope of 
constitutional amendment; or 
Constitutional duty for political 
parties to respect the principles of 
democracy; or 
Most constitutional scholars will 
consider proscription of parties 
unconstitutional 
Constitutional provisions explicitly 
permitting restrictions on core rights 
of association when necessary to 
protect fundamental democratic 
principles or other core features of 
the constitutional order 
 
 
B ‘Anti-system ideology’ and ‘anti-system behaviour’ bans 
 
The model introduces a new variable which distinguishes between states that may ban 
a) parties only for anti-democratic or anti-system behaviour and b) those which may 
also, or only, ban parties for holding anti-democratic or anti-system ideologies. The 
principal advantage of this addition is that it provides a more nuanced understanding 
of the conditions under which a procedural democracy, such as Spain, can ban a 
political party and yet continue to claim that all political programmes, even anti-
democratic ones, ought be aired in the course of democratic competition.  
 
Admittedly, the line between what constitutes anti-system ideology and anti-system 
behaviour may sometimes be rather fuzzy. Symbolic action may deliver clear 
ideological messages: Public displays of a national flag or use of a banned minority 
 22 
languages may communicate commitments to self-determination. Attending the 
funeral, visiting the grave, or displaying an image of a prominent political figure may 
communicate support for particular political projects. So might refusal to publically 
condemn acts of political violence or participation in a public commemorative 
‘minute of silence’.  Nevertheless, it is not unusual for scholars to contrast legislative 
measures employed against extremist parties according to those that address:  
the ‘Sein or ‘being’ of a party of group – the ideological character of the 
party…– and its Handeln or ‘acting’ – which mainly regards unconventional, 
illegal or violent nature of political behaviour and strategies.67  
Mudde has distinguished an ‘American’ from a ‘German’ model of responses to 
extremism using similar criteria.68 The American model permits ‘all ideas’ in the 
democratic “marketplace of ideas” whether they are democratic or not’, but does not 
accept all actions, especially those of violent groups. In contrast the ‘German model’ 
severely punishes anti-democratic actions and ideas opposed to the fundamental 
principles of the free democratic order. Similarly, Issacharof contrasts action-oriented 
proscription by states, like Spain, which ‘prohibit parties that are deemed to be fronts 
for terrorist or paramilitary groups’ with that employed by ‘states that forbid the 
formation of parties hostile to democracy, as Germany has done in banning any 
successors… to the Nazi or Communist parties’; and states that ‘impose content 
restrictions on the views that parties may hold, as with the requirement in Turkey of 
fidelity to the principles of secular democracy as a condition of eligibility for elected 
office’ or Israel which, ‘through its Basic Law, excludes from the electoral arena any 
party that rejects the democratic and Jewish character of the state, as well as any party 
whose platform is deemed an incitement to racism’.69  
 
Despite its fuzzy borders, this variable is also conceived as a dichotomous variable. 
Some democracies will ban parties exclusively on the grounds of anti-system 
activities, while others will permit proscription of parties both for holding anti-system 
ideologies and conducting anti-system behaviour or only their anti-system ideologies. 
And finally, it is important to be aware that this distinction entails a caveat, ‘when 
they do ban parties’, democracies will do so for either anti-system behaviour etc…. 
                                                 
67 Capoccia op cit n. 11supra  at 13. 
68 Mudde op cit n. 9 supra at 196. 
69 S. Issacharof, ‘Fragile Democracies’, (2007) 120 Harvard Law Review 1409. 
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This caveat helps retain the integrity of a model which explicitly accounts for the fact 
that either procedural or substantive democracies may choose not to ban political 
parties. 
 
C ‘Active’, ‘passive’ and ‘permissive’ orientations to proscription 
 
Cross-cutting the vertical and horizontal axis is a third variable which retains Fox and 
Nolte’s distinction between states which actively employ available legal rules to ban 
extremist political parties on the one hand, and those which have no such rules or 
have them but do not implement them in practice. In Figure 2, this variable is 
indicated by contrasting background patterns. However, my model does away with 
Fox and Nolte’s confusing associations between inaction and tolerance, on the one 
hand, and action and militancy, on the other, by relabeling categories. Thus, my 
model distinguishes between democracies that actively employ the tool of proscription 
against extremist parties and those that that abstain from employing this tool. The 
second, abstentionist category includes two subcategories: democracies that adopt a 
permissive stance by choosing not to adopt or use measures permitting proscription of 
extremist parties at all; and democracies that remain passive in the face of extremist 
parties, even though equipped with legal instruments for proscription. The inclusion 
of these two subcategories acknowledges the qualitative difference which enactment 
of anti-extremist legislation provides; or as Capoccia puts it ‘the mere existence of 
legislation may very well act as a deterrent to extremist actors, thereby restricting the 
range of strategies available to them for political proselytism’.70  
 
This new model has several advantages. It permits elaboration of a more meaningful 
conception of what constitutes a broadly ‘tolerant’, and a broadly ‘intolerant’ response 
on the matter of banning extremist parties. Thus, a ‘tolerant democracy’ includes 
states taking an abstentionist stance, including either passive or permissive 
orientations, while an ‘intolerant democracy’ is one taking an activist stance by 
actually banning parties either for anti-democratic actions or ideas. This reformulation 
does away with the jarring associations integral to Fox and Nolte’s categories of 
‘militant procedural’ and ‘tolerant substantive’ democracy.  
                                                 
70 Capoccia op cit n. 11 supra at 20. 
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A second advantage of this model is that it permits a more plausible classification of 
state practices and legal regimes regarding the proscription of political parties. Like 
Pedahzur’s and Fox and Nolte’s models, this one also permits both cross-cultural 
synchronic comparisons and diachronic comparisons within individual states over 
time. This cannot be the place for detailed elaboration, but it is possible to plot the 
positions of Spain and a number of other prominent cases in Figure 2 to illustrate the 
plausibility of the model. Spain can be classified as an activist procedural democracy 
that bans political parties for anti-system behaviour. Prior to the proscription of HB, 
EH and Batasuna in 2003, Spain could be classed as a passive procedural democracy 
equipped to ban parties for anti-system behaviour, given that provisions of an earlier 
Law on Political Parties (Law 54/1978) and the Penal Code permitting proscription of 
parties were unused.  
 
Germany can be considered a fairly unambiguous case of a substantive democracy, 
which has actively employed the instruments of militant democracy against political 
parties for anti-system behaviour and/or ideas.71 This was clearly the case in the 1950s 
when it banned the Socialist Reich Party and the Communist Party of Germany in 
accordance with Basic Law article 21.2 provisions permitting proscription of parties 
undermining the ‘free democratic basic order’. It could also be argued that more 
recent attempts to invoke this provision against the National Democratic Party of 
Germany justify this classification for the present. The case ultimately failed on 
procedural grounds rather than because the government and parliament were 
unwilling to invoke available legal instruments to ban an extremist political party.72  
 
France may be reclassified as a substantive democracy which actively, if not always 
consistently, employs instruments for banning political parties for anti-system 
behaviour.73 Article 89.5 of the 1958 French Constitution establishes what some have 
                                                 
71 Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra at 415-417; Thiel op cit n. 4 supra at 394. 
72 Thiel op cit n. 4 supra at 112.  During the case, it emerged that a large percentage of the National 
Democratic Party (NPD’s) inner circle were in fact undercover agents or informants for the German 
security services and that the agents had influenced party activities. However, when the Constitutional 
Court called for names of agents and the security services refused to do so, the case against the was 
closed (Thiel op cit n. 4 supra at 122). 
73 Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra at 411-412; Thiel op cit n. 4 supra at 390; C.L. Buis, ‘France’, in M. 
Thiel (ed), The Militant Democracy Principle in modern democracies (Ashgate, 2009) 
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called an ‘eternity clause’ in which ‘the republican form of government shall not be 
subject to amendment’ and article 4 requires that parties respect the principles of 
national sovereignty and democracy.74 While this has led various scholars to classify 
France as a substantive democracy,75 Buis notes disagreement among French jurists 
on the constitutional significance of the provisions but increasing support for the view 
that the Constitutions’ article 89.5 at least limits the permissible actions of state 
organs.76 This disagreement suggests further research is needed to confirm 
classification. Nevertheless, legislation permits dissolution, by the President, of 
parties that ‘attack the integrity of the territory or republican form of government’.77 
The use of violence is the main operational criteria for implementation,78 which 
suggests France ought, as a rule, be classified as a democracy that bans parties for 
anti-system behaviour. However, the fact that some separatist groups have been 
banned without having executed plans threatening territorial integrity,79 suggests 
France sometimes strays into the category in which democracies also ban parties for 
anti-system ideologies.  
 
Italy represents a fairly unambiguous example of a passive substantive democracy, 
which has failed to employ available instruments to ban extremist political parties.80 
The 1948 Italian Constitution (XII Transitory and Final Provision) forbids re-
emergence of the dissolved fascist party and the 1952 Scelba Law provided for the 
definition and punishment of associations wanting to recreate a fascist party.81 
Nevertheless, the Italian approach to extremism has been to eschew proscription, 
initially in favour of collusion among mainstream parties to keep extremist parties out 
of government and later integrating them into government circles.82 
 
The United Kingdom is an example of a procedural democracy which currently 
adopts a passive orientation to extremist parties. It is procedural because the most 
                                                 
74 Buis op cit n. 73 supra at 81-2, 89. 
75 Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra 411-412; Theil op cit n. 4 supra at 390. 
76 Buis op cit n. 73 supra at 82-84, 89. 
77 Ibid, 89. 
78 Ibid, 90. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Thiel op cit n. 4 supra 394. 
81 S. Ceccanti and F. Clementi, ‘Italy’ in M. Thiel (ed), The Militant Democracy Principle in modern 
democracies (Ashgate, 2009) at 212. 
82 Ibid, 210-217. 
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fundamental constitutional norm of the British constitution is the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, which permits the Westminster Parliament to make or 
unmake any law it chooses, including those which appear to establish constitutional 
fundamentals.83 The British parliament has enacted laws permitting the dissolution of 
certain groups, including political parties – such as section 2(I)(b) of the Public Order 
Act of 1936 or Section 28.2 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 
1991.84 However, the UK approach has been what Mullender describes as a 
‘piecemeal approach’ ‘focusing on the activities of a particular group in a way that 
speaks concretely to the threats they pose’ and ‘reluctance to justify intervention by 
reference to grand overarching theory’.85 It has thus resisted calls to ban parties of the 
extreme right, with the notable exception of the wartime dissolution of the British 
Union of Fascists in May 1940.86 Similarly, a ban on Sinn Fein, a party openly siding 
with terrorist group, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), was lifted in 1975 and not 
reinstated even though IRA attacks continued.87  
 
Japan is an example of what I have called a ‘permissive democracy’, a democracy 
which chooses not to adopt or use measures permitting proscription of extremist 
parties at all. Various scholars concur in their characterisation of Japan as a 
‘procedural democracy’.88 The 1946 Japanese constitution is silent on the matter of 
militant democracy and does not stipulate a forfeiture of rights and freedoms in case 
of their abuse.89  In addition, most constitutional scholars consider the proscription of 
political parties unconstitutional, due to the absence of specific constitutional 
provisions permitting restriction and the presence of free speech and association 
guarantees90 and because the constitution prohibits the imposition of an obligation to 
respect constitutional values on private individuals through legislation.91 Moreover, as 
Sakaguchi observes, the only occasions when an ‘enemy of freedom’ was denied 
                                                 
83 R. Mullender, ‘United Kingdom’ in M. Thiel (ed.) The ‘Militant Democracy’ Principle in Modern 
Democracies (Ashgate, 2009) at 312. 
84 Fox and Nolte op cit n.4 supra at 407. 
85 Mullender op cit n. 83 supra at 311. 
86 P. Ignazi, Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 175.  
87 C. Knox, ‘Sinn Fein and Local Elections: The Government’s response in Northern Ireland, (1990) 43 
Parliamentary Affairs 448. 
88 Fox and Nolte op cit n. 4 supra at 408-9; Thiel op cit n. 4 supra at 391; Sojiro Sakaguchi, ‘Japan’ in 
M. Thiel (ed.) The Militant Democracy Principle in Modern Democracies (Ashgate, 2009). 
89 Sakaguchi op cit n. 88 supra at 226-7.  
90 Fox and Notle op cit n. 4 supra at 408. 
91 Sakaguchi op cit n. 88 supra at 227. 
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‘protection of the constitution’ – or when the rights and privileges of political 
associations or parties were curtailed’ – was carried out on instruction of occupation 




In this article, I have sought to address the weakness of the paradigmatic concept of 
‘militant democracy’ for understanding variation in state responses to political 
extremism and more specifically for the proscription of political parties. I did so by 
reviewing two of the most developed and widely known accounts of variation in state 
responses to extremism – developed by Pedhazur and Fox and Nolte. Each approach 
provided important insights, but failed to identify variables accounting for varying 
orientations to party bans in democratic states. Careful examination of the 
circumstances in which Spain banned HB, EH and Batasuna - a case which 
highlighted the fundamental problem of internal consistency in Fox and Nolte’s 
model - suggested an additional variable which could be added to, and resolve the 
main problem with, Fox and Nolte’s model. More specifically, the modifications I 
introduce to that model incorporate the distinction, articulated by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court and various legal scholars, between a party banned for espousing 
anti-democratic or anti-system ideas, on the one hand, and a party banned for using 
undemocratic behaviour (such as violence) to pursue its goals, on the other. The 
principal advantage of this model is that it permits a more plausible classification of a 
number of well-known cases of state orientations to proscription and employs the 
concept of tolerance in a manner consistent with common sense and scholarly 
conceptions. Further research is needed to determine whether it is applicable to a 
broader range of cases. 
                                                 
92 Ibid, 227-232. 
